3<sup>rd</sup> EBA Policy Research Workshop

# The credibility of European banks' risk-weighted capital: structural differences or national segmentations?

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- Background
- Related literature
- Sample and key variables
- Results
  - Why do risk weights differ across banks?
  - Why do some banks use internal models more?
  - Do investors believe in Basel's risk weights?
- Final remarks



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### Background: Wide distrust of banks' RWs

- Market participants have questioned the reliability and comparability of RWs, and focused on "adjusted" capital ratios
- Regulators have endorsed the use of "plain", un-weighted capital ratios as a backstop against the opportunistic use of risk-weighted measures
- National supervisors have sometimes introduced «floors» to risk-weights for specific portfolios

Capital

Dec 8th 2012

Economist

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#### **Related literature**

- Practitioners and supervisors
  - e.g. BIS 2013; EBA 2013: RWAs show considerable differences both cross banks and cross countries
- Academic literature
  - Vallascas and Hagendorff (2013), show that riskweights are ill-calibrated to a market measure of bank portfolio risk (i.e., bank asset volatility)
  - Mariathasan and Merrouche (2013) find that average risk-weights decrease once internal models gain regulatory approval, and this is especially true for capital-constrained banks

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### **Sample selection**

- Source of data
  - Statements
  - Pillar 3 Reports
    - Compulsory, but not standardised
- 17 countries: EU, Norway and Switzerland
- 50 largest banks by total assets in 2012
  - 48 are listed
  - 49 adopt IFRS
- Balanced panel over 2008-2012

Belgium	2
Denmark	2
Finland	1
France	5
Germany	3
Greece	4
Hungary	1
Ireland	2
Italy	8
Netherlands	2
Norway	1
Poland	1
Portugal	2
Spain	5
Sweden	4
Switzerland	2
United Kingdom	5
All	50
- Contraction of the local division of the l	



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#### **RW-related variables**

 $RWATA = \frac{Total \ RWA}{Total \ Assets}$ 

Widely used, includes all risks, excludes OBS items

 $RWAEAD = \frac{RWA for Credit Risk}{EAD for the Credit Portfolio}$ 

Requires Pillar 3 data, focuses on credit risk, includes OBS items



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#### **Cross-country differences** and dynamics

ndrea Resti, 2014

Change in 2008-12 in RWA\_EAD (countries with at least 3 banks)



#### Main explanatory variables

	Name	Description
ciness	SIZE	Natural log of total assets
Busidels	DEPOSITS	Customer deposits / total assets
nie	LOANS	Loans / total assets
	CORPORATE	Corporate loans / total loans
	RETAIL	Retail loans / total loans
ist i	ROA	Return on assets (winsorised)
onomicary	GDP_GROWTH	Annual real growth in national GDP
Econervison	BANKCONC	Share of top 3 banks on total assets
SUP	BANKONGDP	Bank total assets on GDP
Risk	STANDARD	Loans under standardised approach / total loans
models	IRB_LOANS	Loans under internal ratings-based approach / total loans
	HIGH_RETCORP_IRB	Dummy for heavy users of internal ratings-based models
501	CDSSPREAD	CDS spread
rick and	WACC	Weighted average cost of capital
Riscapital	ASSETVOL	Asset volatility
Con	ZSCORE	Z-score (measure of credit risk)
And	IMPAIRED_LOANS	SImpaired loans / total loans
	TIER1	Tier 1 capital / risk-weighted assets

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### Univariate analysis / 1

Business models							Correlation with	
	Mean	Median	Max	Min	Sigma	Obs	RWATA	RWAEAD
SIZE	12.5	12.5	14.7	10.3	1.3	250	-65.4%***	-52.5%***
DEPOSITS	48.6	48.7	94.7	4	15.2	250	45.3%***	37.5%***
LOANS	53.9	59.3	81.7	12.2	17.8	250	74.4%***	57.6%***
RETAIL	30.3	31.4	11.9	0.0	58.8	250	25.2%***	16.7%***
CORPORATE	35.8	36.1	9.5	6.3	54.9	250	2.30%	6.60%
INSTITUTIONS	12.2	10.0	9.4	0.9	48.2	250	-30.5%***	-28.6***
GOVERNMENTS	12.0	11.9	6.0	0.0	28.6	250	-18.7%***	-17.6%***
ROA	0.1	0.3	0.6	-1.6	0.9	250	-0.4%	-0.2%

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Banks showing higher risk weights are smaller, more involved in the traditional loans/deposits business, more exposed to retail portfolios (as opposed to governments and financial institutions)

### Univariate analysis / 2

Risk models	Correlation with							
	Mean	Median	Max	Min	Sigma	Obs	RWATA	RWAEAD
STANDARD_LOANS	45	37.3	100	1.9	30.6	250	74.2%***	69.6%***
IRB_LOANS	55	62.7	98.1	0	30.6	250	-74.2%***	-69.6%***
FIRB_LOANS	10.5	0	92	0	18.1	250	-9.90%	-12.0%*
AIRB_LOANS	43.5	47.7	98.1	0	30.7	250	-67.1%***	-61.0%***

Banks showing lower risk weights are heavy users of IRB models, especially advanced ones

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Expected and consistent with the incentives set by Basel II

## Univariate analysis / 3

(IV) - Capital and risk							Correlation with	
	Mean	Median	Max	Min	Sigma	Obs	RWATA	RWAEAD
VOLATILITY	3.4	3.1	10.3	1	1.5	240	1.60%	<u>    5.90%     </u>
CDSSPREAD	274.0	146.1	353.2	28.7	1999.4	218	34.8%***	25.0%***
WACC	6.4	5.6	3.1	2.9	21.2	250	41.1%***	32.4%***
IMPAIRED_LOANS	5.8	4.4	32.6	0.4	5.3	250	33.8%***	30.1%***
ASSET_VOL	15.8	10.1	172.1	1.6	20.8	277	14.1%**	12.6%*
Z_SCORE	2.5	2.4	12.4	-1.5	2.1	286	-18.7%***	-24.4%***
TIER1	11	10.8	21.3	-6.7	3.5	250	-55.5%***	-55.2%***

Risk-weight based indicators are not inconsistent with most market-based risk measures (CDS, WACC, ASSETVOL, ZSCORE) and the banks' actual bad loans experience (impairment ratio).

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A negative link with risk-weighted capital suggests that investors/supervisors look at un-weighted leverage, too.



"odds ratio"

### Multivariate results: x\_OR = ln[x/(1-x)] "Why do RWs differ across banks?"

			RWAT	A_OR	RWAEAD_OR
	Variable		Coef	Std. Coef.	Coef Std. Coef.
	Constant	-	0.920		Higher RWs for small
	SIZE		-0.184***	-0.234	banks, strongly geared
	DEPOSITS		0.009**	0.130	towards loans and
	LOANS		0.017***	0.298	traditional portfolios
	CORPORATE	0.014***	0.129		
	HIGH_RETCORP_IRB		-0.329**	-0.165	Low RWS for heavy IRB
	TIER1_RWA		-0.048***	-0.169	users and well-
	GDP_GROWTH		0.021*	0.061	capitalised banks
	GDP_GROWTH× HIG	H_RETCORP_IRB	-0.026*	-0.053	GDP slowdowns cause
	France		0.012		shift to conservative
	Germany	Nationa	-0.141		assets (en Treasuries)
012	Greece	segmentations	, 0.157		but increase default
<b>t</b> i .	Italy	especially	0.146		rates for IRR users
Ses	Spain	pain outside SSN			
99	Sweden		-0.372***		-0.203*
Jdre	UK		0.313**		0.331***
A	Adj. R-square		0.833		0.671

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#### Multivariate results: Why do some banks use IRB more?"

Large, well capitalised banks use IRB more

hanks use		(	(I) IRB_LOANS_OR		(II) IRB_LOANS_OR		(III) IRB_LOANS_OR		(IV) IRB_LOANS_OR		
IR	R more		Coef	Std. Coef.	Coef	Std. Coef.	Coef	Std. Coef.	Coef	Std. Coef.	
TIV	Constant		.03***		-6.42***		-10.27***		-10.92***		
	SIZE	0.	542***	0.689	0.617***	0.784	0.519***	0.659	0.559***	0.710	
	DEPOSITS	-0	.025**	-0.375	-0.023**	-0.349	-0.011	-0.164	-0.011	-0.167	
	LOANS	-	0.021	-0.380	-0.018	-0.316	-0.005	-0.087	-0.007	-0.124	
	CORPORATE	(	0.009	0.083	0.013	0.119	0.006	0.061	0.004	0.039	
	RETAIL	0.	.029**	0.344	0.015	0.180	0.005	0.061	0.008	0.092	
	TIER1_RWA	0.	144***	0.508	0.057*	0.200	0.050	0.175	0.050*	0.175	
	France		-		-1.024**		0.362		-		
	Germany		but	national	-1.240***		-0.235		-		
	Greece				-1.045		-0.231				
	Italy		Super	VISOLY	-1.759***		-0.379	which	which in turn are driven by the banking		
14	Spain		pracu		-0.256		0.388	driven			
, 20	Sweden		matte	er	0.260		0.052	industr	industry's lobbying		
esti	UK		-		-0.446		0.133	power			
aR	BANKCONC	-			-		0.039**	0.527	0.042***	0.573	
dre	BANKONGDP	-			-		0.257***	0.485	0.267***	0.503	
And	Adj. R-SO		0.5	577	0.6	585	0.7	'21	0.7	'12	

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### Multivariate results: "Do investors believe in Basel's RWs?"

	WACC	WACC	CDSSpread	CDSSpread	Asset Vol	Asset Vol	Z-Score	Z-Score
Constant	RWs affeo	ct market	-based m	easures o	of risk	0.385***	5.739**	5.649**
RWATA	0.058***	0.057***	4.283**	4.838***	0.006**	0.006***	-0.002	-
RWAEAD_O	0.021	-	3.229*	-	-0.002	-	-0.051***	-
SIZE	0.044	-	11.168	-	0.006	-	-0.301**	-0.239*
DEPOSITS	0.023*	0.034***	-1.655	-	0.001	-	0.013	-
LOANS	Tradit	ional len	ding busi	nesses ar	e perceiv	ed as les	s risky 📃	-0.021*
CORPORATE	-0.059***	-0.056***	-3.476***	-3.199**	-0.006*	-0.005**	0.009	-
RETAIL	-0.025**	-0.033***	-1.480	-	-0.001	-	0.031***	0.031***
EQUITY_RATIO	0.165*	Ac	counting	measure	s of risk a	and retur	n do mat	ter -
IMPAIRED_LOANS	0.088***	0.103***	1.339	-	0.021***	0.023***	-0.043	-
ROA	-1.268***	-1.031***	-157.70***	-154.97***	-0.023	-	0.647***	0.971***
GDP_GROWTH	-0.443***	-0.405***	-54.415***	-53.869***	0.013	0.014**	0.001	-
Adj. R2	0.790	0.783	0.846	Time a	nd countr	ry dummi	es are sig	gnificant
F on countries	13.69***	26.31***	24.37***	70.94***	2.05*	2.55**	9.38***	22.30***
F on years	17.10***	15.79***	14.69***	21.47***	18.74***	15.93***	19.88***	22.85***

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#### **Final remarks**

- Risk weights are affected by the banks' size, business model and asset mix
- The adoption of internal ratings based (IRB) approaches is (as expected) a powerful driver of bank risk-weighted assets
- Lower risk weights are positively linked to the banks' capital cushion
- IRB adoption is more widespread in countries where supervisory capture is potentially stronger
- Regulatory risk weights are not disconnected from market-based measures of bank risk

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