Comparing Flat and Risk-based Capital Requirements

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European Banking Authority Policy Research Workshop London, 26 November 2014

The Basel Committee milestones

• Capital Accord of 1988: Basel I

 \rightarrow First international agreement on capital requirements

• Market Risk Amendment of 1996

 \rightarrow Introduction of internal models (VaR) in regulation

- Revised Capital Adequacy Framework of 2004: Basel II \rightarrow Extension of use of internal models to credit risk
- The New Regulatory Framework of 2010: Basel III

 \rightarrow Regulatory response to financial crisis that started in 2007

From Basel I to Basel II

- Correcting perceived shortcomings of Basel I
 - \rightarrow Insufficient risk differentiation
 - → Regulatory capital arbitrage (RCA)

"RCA is driven by large divergences that frequently arise between underlying economic risks and the notions and measures of risk embodied in regulatory capital ratios."

David Jones (2000)

Basel II

- Replaces flat with risk-based capital requirements
- Internal Ratings-based Approach (IRB)
 - \rightarrow Capital must cover losses with confidence level 99.9%
 - \rightarrow Bank's probability of failure should be smaller than 0.1%

From Basel II to Basel III

• Correcting perceived shortcomings of Basel II

"The Basel II approach to regulating bank capital was a comprehensive failure. The **numerator** of the regulatory ratio did not reflect an institution's ability to absorb loss without going to resolution and the **denominator** did not capture the most important risks to which banks were exposed. Moreover, the **minimum** was set much too low."

Richard Herring (2011)

Basel III

- Numerator: Stricter definition of equity capital
- Denominator: Higher weights for riskier assets
- Minimum: Higher requirements
- Capital conservation buffer
- Countercyclical capital buffer
- Non-risk-based leverage ratio
- Liquidity risk requirements

Admati and Hellwig (2013)

• Capital requirements should be (i) much higher and (ii) flat

(i) "Requiring that banks' equity be at least on the order of20-30 percent of their total assets would make the financialsystem substantially safer."

(ii) "The risk-weighting approach is extremely complex and has many unintended consequences that harm the financial system."

Hanson, Kashyap, and Stein (2011)

• One should worry about impact on shadow banking system

"While higher capital and liquidity requirements on banks will no doubt help to insulate banks from the consequences of large shocks, the danger is that they will also **drive a larger share of intermediation into the shadow banking realm**."

Key issue

• Effect of higher flat and/or risk-based capital requirements

 \rightarrow When we take into account shadow banking system

 \rightarrow How shadow banks affect effectiveness of regulation?

What is the problem?

• There is no analytical framework to address these issues

"I am not aware of any model that captures properly the relevant trade-offs between this or other proposals and the status quo." Anat Admati (2014)

• This paper is a first attempt to construct such framework

Overview of model

- Four types of agents
 - → Entrepreneurs require funds for their risky projects
 - → **Banks** fund entrepreneurs' projects
 - \rightarrow **Investors** provide funds (debt and equity) to the banks
 - → **Consumers** buy output of entrepreneurs' projects
- Entrepreneurs are of different risk types
- Equity is more expensive than debt

Bank monitoring

• Banks can monitor entrepreneurs' projects

 \rightarrow Reduces probability of failure

- Monitoring is costly and not observed by debtholders
 - \rightarrow Moral hazard problem
 - \rightarrow which equity capital serves to ameliorate

Two types of financial contracts

- Contracts associated with positive monitoring
 - \rightarrow Banks that **originate-to-hold**
 - \rightarrow Traditional banking system
- Contracts associated with zero monitoring
 - → Market finance or banks that **originate-to-distribute**
 - \rightarrow Shadow banking system

Main results (i)

- Flat capital requirements
 - \rightarrow Make (some) traditional banks safer
 - \rightarrow Drives safest borrowers to shadow banking system
 - \rightarrow Standard regulatory capital arbitrage
- Risk-based capital requirements (à la Basel II)
 - \rightarrow Make (some) traditional banks safer
 - \rightarrow Drives riskiest borrowers to shadow banking system
 - \rightarrow Novel regulatory capital arbitrage

Main results (ii)

- Much higher flat capital requirements may be bad
 - \rightarrow Expand size of (low risk) shadow banking system
 - \rightarrow Reduce monitoring for low risk borrowers
- Much higher risk-based capital requirements may be worse
 - \rightarrow Expand size of (high risk) shadow banking system
 - \rightarrow Reduce monitoring for high risk borrowers
 - \rightarrow The ones that benefit from monitoring the most

Main results (iii)

- Putting together flat and risk-based requirements (à la Basel III)
 - \rightarrow Expands size of shadow banking system at both ends
 - \rightarrow Combines the pros and cons of Basel I and Basel II
- Optimal (welfare maximizing) regulation
 - \rightarrow Lower than flat & higher than risk-based for safer types
 - \rightarrow Higher than flat & lower than risk-based for riskier types

Overview

- Model setup
- Equilibrium
 - \rightarrow Laissez-faire
 - \rightarrow Flat capital requirements
 - \rightarrow Risk-based capital requirements
- Welfare
- Concluding remarks

Part 1 Model setup

Model setup

- Two dates (t = 0, 1)
- Agents: \rightarrow Set of potential **entrepreneurs**
 - \rightarrow Set of risk-neutral **banks**
 - \rightarrow Set of risk-neutral **investors**
 - \rightarrow Set of **consumers**
- Entrepreneurs have projects that require bank finance
- Banks raise funds by issuing uninsured debt and equity

Entrepreneurs

- Continuum of entrepreneurs of observable types $p \in [0,1]$
- Each entrepreneur of type *p* has risky project

Unit investment
$$\rightarrow$$
 Return = $\begin{cases} R_p, \text{ with prob. } 1-p+m\\ 0, \text{ with prob. } p-m \end{cases}$

 $\rightarrow m \in [0, p]$ is the monitoring intensity of lending bank

Entrepreneurs and banks

• Single bank for each type of entrepreneur

 \rightarrow All entrepreneurs of type *p* borrow from this bank

- Returns of entrepreneurs of type *p* are perfectly correlated
 → Portfolio return coincides with single project return
- Loan market is contestable (limit pricing)

 \rightarrow Equilibrium loan rate is lowest feasible rate

Bank monitoring

• Monitoring is not observed by debtholders

 \rightarrow Moral hazard problem

• Monitoring entails cost c(m), with c'(m) > 0 and c''(m) > 0

 \rightarrow For numerical results assume

$$c(m) = \frac{\gamma}{2}m^2$$
 with $\gamma > 0$

Investors

• Two types of risk-neutral investors

 \rightarrow Debtholders: Require expected return normalized to 0

 \rightarrow Shareholders: Require expected return $\delta > 0$ (cost of capital)

Consumers

• Representative consumer à la Dixit-Stiglitz

 \rightarrow Continuum of goods produced by entrepreneurs

- \rightarrow CES utility function
- Price R_p of type p good determined by

$$R_p = R(x_p) = x_p^{-1/\sigma}$$
 with $\sigma > 1$

 \rightarrow where x_p is aggregate investment of entrepreneurs of type p

 \rightarrow Loan demand function

$$x_p = x(R_p) = R_p^{-\sigma}$$

Summing up

- Three key parameters
 - \rightarrow Cost of capital δ
 - \rightarrow Monitoring cost parameter γ
 - \rightarrow Elasticity of loan demand function σ

Part 2 Equilibrium

Part 2a Laissez-faire

Banks' funding and lending contracts

The single bank lending to entrepreneurs of type p sets

(1) Capital k_p per unit of loans

(2) Interest rate B_p offered to debtholders

(3) Interest rate R_p offered to entrepreneurs

Such contract determines monitoring m_p

Banks' profits

• Profits of bank lending to type *p* (per unit of loans)

$$\pi_p = (1 - p + m_p)[R_p - (1 - k_p)B_p] - c(m_p)$$

- \rightarrow With probability $1 p + m_p$ gets R_p and pays $(1 k_p)B_p$
- \rightarrow With probability $p m_p$ gets and pays 0 (limited liability)
- \rightarrow With probability 1 incurs monitoring cost $c(m_p)$
- \rightarrow To simplify notation let's drop subscript p

Banks' objective function

- Given loan market contestability
 - \rightarrow Banks' objective function is to minimize loan rates
 - \rightarrow subject to optimal (private) choice of monitoring
 - \rightarrow and debt- and shareholders' participation constraints

Optimal contract

• Optimal (limit price) contract is array (k^*, B^*, R^*, m^*) that solves min *R*

 \rightarrow subject to incentive compatibility constraint (IC)

$$m^* = \arg\max_{m} \left\{ (1 - p + m) [R^* - (1 - k^*)B^*] - c(m) \right\}$$

 \rightarrow shareholders' participation constraint (SPC)

$$\pi_p^* = (1 - p + m^*)[R^* - (1 - k^*)B^*] - c(m^*) \ge (1 + \delta)k^*$$

 \rightarrow and debtholders' participation constraint (DPC)

$$(1-p+m^*)B^* \ge 1$$

Characterization of optimal contract (i)

• IC constraint

$$m^* = \arg\max_{m} \left\{ (1 - p + m) [R^* - (1 - k^*)B^*] - c(m) \right\}$$

 \rightarrow Interior solution characterized by FOC

$$R - (1 - k)B = c'(m)$$

 \rightarrow From here it follows that

$$\frac{dm}{dR} > 0, \ \frac{dm}{dk} > 0, \ \text{and} \ \frac{dm}{dB} < 0$$

Characterization of optimal contract (ii)

• DPC satisfied with equality

Otherwise: lower $B \rightarrow \text{higher } m \rightarrow \text{lower } R$

• SPC satisfied with equality

Otherwise: higher $k \rightarrow \text{higher } m \rightarrow \text{lower } R$

• Substituting DPC into SPC gives single PC

$$(1-p+m)R = 1 + \delta k + c(m)$$

 \rightarrow Expected return = funding cost + monitoring cost

Proposition 1

• There is a marginal type

$$\hat{p} = 1 - \sqrt{\frac{1 + \delta}{\delta c''(0)}}$$

 \rightarrow Banks lending to types $p \le \hat{p}$ choose $k_p^* = m_p^* = 0$

 \rightarrow Banks lending to types $p > \hat{p}$ choose $k_p^* > 0$ and $m_p^* > 0$

Comments on Proposition 1

- Safer entrepreneurs borrow from shadow banks (or the market)
 → No capital and no monitoring
- Riskier entrepreneurs borrow from traditional banks
 → Positive capital and positive monitoring
- Higher cost of capital (δ) or higher cost of monitoring (γ)
 → Expand the set of entrepreneurs funded by shadow banks
- If monitoring cost is sufficiently small $(\gamma \leq 1+1/\delta)$

 \rightarrow All entrepreneurs borrow from traditional banks

Numerical illustration

• Focus on qualitative results

 \rightarrow Not a calibration

• Parameters chosen to facilitate graphical representation


 \rightarrow Monitoring cost parameter $\gamma = 6$

 \rightarrow Cost of capital $\delta = 20\%$


• These parameters imply $\hat{p} = 0$

 \rightarrow No shadow banking in the absence of regulation

Capital under laissez-faire



Risk under laissez-faire



p

Part 2b

Flat capital requirements

Flat capital requirements

• Introducing a flat capital requirement à la Basel I


$$k_p \ge \overline{k}$$

 \rightarrow Only applies to traditional banks (not shadow banks)


Proposition 2

- Effects of flat capital requirement
 - 1. Drives safest borrowers to shadow banking system
 - 2. Safer traditional banks become safer
 - 3. Riskier traditional banks remain as before
 - \rightarrow First effect rationalizes idea of regulatory capital arbitrage


Capital under a flat requirement



Risk under a flat requirement



Increasing flat requirement



Part 2c

Risk-based capital requirements

Risk-based capital requirements (i)

• Introducing a risk-based capital requirement à la Basel II

 \rightarrow In Basel II

 $\Pr(\text{loan losses} > \overline{k}) = \alpha$

 \rightarrow We postulate

Pr(bank failure $|\bar{k}\rangle = \alpha$

Risk-based capital requirements (ii)

• Three equations

- \rightarrow FOC: R (1-k)B = c'(m)
- \rightarrow DPC: (1-p+m)B=1
- \rightarrow SPC: $(1-p+m)[R-(1-k)B]-c(m)=(1+\delta)k$
- FOC + DPC imply: (1 p + m)R = 1 k + (1 p + m)c'(m)
- DPC + SPC imply: $(1-p+m)R = 1 + \delta k + c(m)$

 \rightarrow Subtracting these two expressions we get

 $(1+\delta)k = (1-p+m)c'(m) - c(m)$

Risk-based capital requirements (iii)

• To ensure

Pr(bank failure
$$|\bar{k}_p) = p - m = \alpha$$


 \rightarrow we require $m = p - \alpha$

• Hence we get the following capital requirements formula

$$\overline{k}_{p} = \frac{(1-\alpha)c'(p-\alpha) - c(p-\alpha)}{1+\delta}$$

 \rightarrow Depends on risk *p*, confidence level α , and cost of capital δ


Risk-based capital requirements




Proposition 3

- Effects of risk-based capital requirement
 - 1. Drives riskiest borrowers to shadow banking system
 - 2. Riskier traditional banks become safer
 - 3. Safer traditional banks remain as before
 - \rightarrow First effect is novel and has been overlooked


Capital under risk-based requirements




Risk under risk-based requirements




An increase in risk-based requirements



Capital under Basel III



Risk under Basel III



Part 3 Welfare analysis

Social welfare

• Debt- and shareholders get required return on their investments

 \rightarrow May be ignored in welfare calculation


- Entrepreneurs get zero profits
- Focus on consumers' surplus

 \rightarrow Triangle under loan demand function $x(R_p) = R_p^{-\sigma}$

 \rightarrow Multiplied by probability of success

$$s_{p} = (1 - p + m_{p}) \int_{R_{p}}^{\infty} R^{-\sigma} dR = (1 - p + m_{p}) \frac{R_{p}^{1 - \sigma}}{\sigma - 1}$$


Welfare triangle




Welfare analysis

- Effect of the following regulatory changes
 - \rightarrow Introducing flat capital requirement (Basel I)
 - \rightarrow Increasing flat capital requirement
 - → Introducing risk-based capital requirement (Basel II)
 - \rightarrow Increasing risk-based capital requirement
- Optimal capital requirements


Introducing flat capital requirement




Increasing flat capital requirement




Introducing risk-based capital requirements



Increasing risk-based capital requirements



Optimal capital requirements



Concluding remarks

Summing up

- Simple model of the effects of bank capital regulation
 - \rightarrow Flat and risk-based capital requirements
 - \rightarrow Competition of shadow banking system
- Framework for thinking about relevant trade-offs
 - \rightarrow Focus on qualitative results
 - \rightarrow Possible building block for richer models

Main results

• Flat capital requirements

 \rightarrow Make (some) traditional banks safer

 \rightarrow Drives safest borrowers to shadow banking system

- Risk-based capital requirements (à la Basel II)
 - \rightarrow Make (some) traditional banks safer
 - \rightarrow Drives riskiest borrowers to shadow banking system

Trade-offs

• Higher capital requirements

→ Ameliorate risk-taking incentives: bright side

 \rightarrow Increase cost of funding: dark side

- Optimal capital requirements
 - \rightarrow Lower than flat & higher than risk-based for safer types
 - \rightarrow Higher than flat & lower than risk-based for riskier types

Some important caveats

- Key role of assumption that equity is more expensive than debt
 → Otherwise 100% capital
- Model completely ignores implementation issues (like Basel)
 - \rightarrow Potential manipulation of risk-weights
 - \rightarrow Rationale for leverage ratio

A final remark

• Model highlights key feature of Basel capital requirements

 \rightarrow Based on purely statistical approach

 \rightarrow Capital requirements defined by condition

 $\Pr(\text{loan losses} > \overline{k}) = \alpha$

• Need to bring economics into banking regulation

 \rightarrow Think in terms of welfare trade-offs

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