Article 94

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Capital Requirements Directive 4 (CRD4) > TITLE VII > CHAPTER 2 > Section II > Sub - Section 3 > Article 94
Title:
Article 94
Description:
Variable elements of remuneration
Main content:
 
(a) where remuneration is performance related, the total amount of remuneration is based on a combination of the assessment of the performance of the individual and of the business unit concerned and of the overall results of the institution and when assessing individual performance, financial and non-financial criteria are taken into account;
 
(b) the assessment of the performance is set in a multi-year framework in order to ensure that the assessment process is based on longer-term performance and that the actual payment of performance-based components of remuneration is spread over a period which takes account of the underlying business cycle of the credit institution and its business risks;
 
(c) the total variable remuneration does not limit the ability of the institution to strengthen its capital base;
 
(d) guaranteed variable remuneration is not consistent with sound risk management or the pay-for-performance principle and shall not be a part of prospective remuneration plans;
 
 
(f) fixed and variable components of total remuneration are appropriately balanced and the fixed component represents a sufficiently high proportion of the total remuneration to allow the operation of a fully flexible policy on variable remuneration components, including the possibility to pay no variable remuneration component;
 
 
(ii) Members States may allow shareholders or owners or members of the institution to approve a higher maximum level of the ratio between the fixed and variable components of remuneration provided the overall level of the variable component shall not exceed 200 % of the fixed component of the total remuneration for each individual. Member States may set a lower maximum percentage.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(h) payments relating to the early termination of a contract reflect performance achieved over time and do not reward failure or misconduct;
 
(i) remuneration packages relating to compensation or buy out from contracts in previous employment must align with the long-term interests of the institution including retention, deferral, performance and clawback arrangements;
 
(j) the measurement of performance used to calculate variable remuneration components or pools of variable remuneration components includes an adjustment for all types of current and future risks and takes into account the cost of the capital and the liquidity required;
 
(k) the allocation of the variable remuneration components within the institution shall also take into account all types of current and future risks;
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(n) the variable remuneration, including the deferred portion, is paid or vests only if it is sustainable according to the financial situation of the institution as a whole, and justified on the basis of the performance of the institution, the business unit and the individual concerned.
 
Without prejudice to the general principles of national contract and labour law, the total variable remuneration shall generally be considerably contracted where subdued or negative financial performance of the institution occurs, taking into account both current remuneration and reductions in payouts of amounts previously earned, including through malus or clawback arrangements.
 
Up to 100 % of the total variable remuneration shall be subject to malus or clawback arrangements. Institutions shall set specific criteria for the application of malus and clawback. Such criteria shall in particular cover situations where the staff member:
 
(i) participated in or was responsible for conduct which resulted in significant losses to the institution;
 
(ii) failed to meet appropriate standards of fitness and propriety;
 
(o) the pension policy is in line with the business strategy, objectives, values and long-term interests of the institution.
 
If the employee leaves the institution before retirement, discretionary pension benefits shall be held by the institution for a period of five years in the form of instruments referred to in point (l). Where an employee reaches retirement, discretionary pension benefits shall be paid to the employee in the form of instruments referred to in point (l) subject to a five-year retention period;
 
(p) staff members are required to undertake not to use personal hedging strategies or remuneration- and liability- related insurance to undermine the risk alignment effects embedded in their remuneration arrangements;
 
(q) variable remuneration is not paid through vehicles or methods that facilitate the non-compliance with this Directive or Regulation (EU) No 575/2013.
 

2. EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards

with respect to specifying the classes of instruments that satisfy the conditions set out in point (l)(ii) of paragraph 1

and

with respect to qualitative and appropriate quantitative criteria to identify categories of staff whose professional activities have a material impact on the institution's risk profile as referred to in Article 92(2).

EBA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission by 31 March 2014.

Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Article 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.

 

 

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