



Expected Losses and Managerial Discretion as Drivers of Countercyclical Loan Loss Provisioning*

Christian Domikowsky | Sven Bornemann | Klaus Düllmann | Philipp Grüber | Andreas Pfingsten

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* The views expressed in this presentation represent the authors' personal opinions and not necessarily those of the Deutsche Bundesbank, the European Central Bank, or any other institution.



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- 1) Motivation
- 2) Empirical setting
- 3) Empirical analysis for the German Commercial Code (HGB)
- 4) Conclusions

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Managers

- are appointed by owners to act in their interest,
- can (to some extent) act in their own interest due to information asymmetry,
- have objectives including, e.g., high income, job security, consumption on the job, high societal status,
- may achieve their objectives in various ways, e.g.,
 - through policies and decisions, for example concerning investments, affecting the real situation of the firm (non-financial and financial),
 - making use of accounting choices (our focus).

Accounting



Objectives include, e.g.,

- presenting a "true and fair view" of the firm,
- allowing comparisons over time and across firms,
- counteracting information asymmetry by
 - providing information useful for decision making *ex-ante*,
 - providing information useful for evaluating decisions and performance *ex-post*, which yields behavioral incentives during a cooperation (*interim*).
 - → Managerial discretion in accounting is seen as evil.



Financial crisis 2007/2009:

- incurred losses in banks increased,
- > banks had to set aside more equity due to risk-based capital requirements,
- Iending to the real sector decreased, thereby amplifying the crisis.
- → Strict accounting rules seen as evil,
 in particular loss recognition only for incurred, but not for expected losses.



Particularly well-suited due to a unique combination of features:

- capital market less relevant as performance benchmark due to very few listed banks,
- performance-pay relatively unimportant in banks, in particular in cooperative banks and savings banks (which together by far dominate the banking sector by numbers), and therefore only weak profit motive for (their) managers' behavior,
- > a culture of reporting, if possible, only small changes in reported annual profits,
- particular accounting rules (explained in detail below) which
 - allow managers to vary reserves without the owners' consent,
 - allow managers to do so without being observed by the public.
- \rightarrow **General research question** (specific versions below):

Are managers of German banks using their discretion in accounting to counteract the procyclical effects of risk-based capital requirements?

2) Empirical setting

Credit risk provisioning under German Commercial Code (HGB)



			Discretion	P&L impact	Tax deductibility	Reg. capital
		340g	yes	yes	no	Tier I
		NSL	no	yes	yes	no
sation		340f	yes	yes	no	Tier II
ompen		GLLP	yes	yes	(yes)	(yes)
Crossover compensation		SLLP	some	yes	yes	(no)
U	_	DWO	no	yes	yes	no



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Research questions



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- 1. Do banks reporting under German HGB build specific loan loss provisions **countercyclically**? If yes, do they ...
 - a. ... engage in earnings management?
 - b. ... explicitly consider the macroeconomic environment?
 - c. ... anticipate expected losses in the next 12 months at the closing date?

- 2. How do banks reporting under German HGB use their **discretion** in the assessment of the reserve components for latent credit risk?
 - a. For earnings management?
 - b. To complement high/low specific LLP?
 - c. To account for the macroeconomic environment?
 - d. To exploit tax rules?

3. What drives the total credit risk reserve of banks under German HGB?

Data and sample selection



- Source: Deutsche Bundesbank's prudential database BAKIS (jointly operated with the German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin)).
- Database comprises all data that had to be filed with the regulatory authorities between 1994 and 2011.
- Coverage: roughly two full economic cycles.
- Loss of some observations due to conventional panel adjustments (first differencing, dropping of IFRS banks + subsidiaries, dropping of obviously incorrect database entries ...).
- Final panel consists of >40,000 observations for >5,000 banks (dominated by Coops and Savings banks, essentially individual accounts).
- For GLLP: further data management to account for tax rules
- ➢ GLLP subsample consists of >6,500 observations for >700 banks (2000-2008)

Variables and research hypotheses: Specific LLP



Hypothesis 1a:	Banks use their discretion to use specific LLP as a tool for
	earnings management.

Hypothesis 1b:Banks might use their discretion to account for the economic
cycle in the build-up of specific LLP.

$$SLLP_{i,t}^{OL} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \cdot SLLP_{i,t-1}^{OL} + \beta_2 \cdot GDPGR_{i,t} + \beta_3 \cdot NDI_{i,t}^{TA}$$

+ $\beta_4 \cdot CHNPL_{i,t+1}^{OL} + \beta_5 \cdot CHNPL_{i,t}^{OL} + \beta_6 \cdot NPL_{i,t-1}^{OL}$
+ $\beta_7 \cdot CHOL_{i,t-1}^{TA} + \beta_8 \cdot TIER12_{i,t-1}^{RWA} + \beta_9 \cdot NSL_{i,t}^{TA}$
+ $\beta_{10} \cdot CH340f_{i,t}^{OL} + \beta_{11} \cdot LNTA_{i,t-1} + \mu_i + \epsilon_{i,t}$



Specific LLP: System GMM Results



Indep.	Exp.	Dep.: SLLP _{i,t}
SLLP _{i,t-1}	(+)	0.120***
GDPGR _t	(+)	0.002
NDI _{i,t}	(+)	0.469***
CHNPL _{i,t+1}	(+)	0.021***
CHNPL _{i,t}	(+)	0.069***
NPL _{i,t-1}	(+)	0.026***
CHOL _{i,t}	(+)	-0.005***
TIER12 _{i,t-1}	(+/-)	-0.014***
NSL _{i,t}	(-)	-0.652***
CH340f _{i,t}	(-)	-0.626***
LNTA _{i,t-1}	(+/-)	0.058***
Obs.		26,930
Test statistics ¹		VALID

¹ Incl. AR (1)/AR (2) tests and Sargan-Hansen test. The number of instruments used is close to the number of clusters (here: 16).

Hypothesis 1a is supported

Banks use their discretion for earnings management.

No evidence for Hypothesis 1b

No significant macro effects (at least for GDPGR_t).

Observation

Specific LLP are built for concurrent and future NPL changes.



Variables and research hypotheses: Changes in 340f reserves



Hypothesis 2: Changes in 340f reserves are mainly used for earnings management.

$$CH340f_{i,t}^{OL} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \cdot CH340f_{i,t-1}^{OL} + \beta_2 \cdot GDPGR_{i,t} + \beta_3 \cdot NDI_{i,t}^{TA} + \beta_4 \cdot CHNPL_{i,t+1}^{OL} + \beta_5 \cdot CHNPL_{i,t}^{OL} + \beta_6 \cdot NPL_{i,t-1}^{OL} + \beta_7 \cdot CHOL_{i,t-1}^{TA} + \beta_8 \cdot TIER12_pre_{i,t-1}^{RWA} + \beta_9 \cdot NSL_{i,t}^{TA} + \beta_{10} \cdot SLLP_{i,t}^{OL} + \beta_{11} \cdot LNTA_{i,t-1} + \beta_{12} \cdot CHOBS_{i,t}^{TA} + \mu_i + \epsilon_{i,t}$$



Changes in 340f reserves : System GMM Results



Indep.	Exp.	Dep.: CH340f _{i,t}		
CH340f _{i,t-1}	(+)	0.089		
GDPGR _t	(+)	-0.006**		
NDI _{i,t}	(+)	0.428***		
CHNPL _{i,t+1}	(+/-)	-0.001		
CHNPL _{i,t}	(+)	0.013**		
NPL _{i,t-1}	(+)	0.006		
CHOL _{i,t}	(+)	-0.004***		
TIER12_pre _{i,t-1}	(+/-)	-0.003		
NSL _{i,t}	(-)	-0.612***		
SLLP _{i,t}	(-)	-0.483***		
LNTA _{i,t-1}	(+/-)	-0.010		
CHOBS _{i,t}	(+)	-0.003*		
Obs.		26,814		
Test statistics ¹		VALID		

¹ Incl. AR (1)/AR (2) tests and Sargan-Hansen test. The number of instruments used is close to the number of clusters (here: 16).

Hypothesis 2 is supported

340f reserves are used to manage earnings.

Observation

They are in particular built when SLLP are low.

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Variables and research hypotheses: General LLP



Hypothesis 3:Banks essentially follow local tax rules in the build-up of generalLLP to reduce their tax burden.

$$\begin{aligned} GLLP_{i,t}^{OL} &= \beta_0 + \beta_1 \cdot GLLP_{i,t-1}^{OL} + \beta_2 \cdot GDPGR_{i,t} + \beta_3 \cdot NDI_{i,t}^{TA} \\ &+ \beta_4 \cdot CHNPL_{i,t+1}^{OL} + \beta_5 \cdot GLLPTD_{i,t}^{OL} + \beta_6 \cdot CHNPL_{i,t}^{OL} \\ &+ \beta_7 \cdot NPL_{i,t-1}^{OL} + \beta_8 \cdot IBL_{i,t-1}^{TA} + \beta_9 \cdot TIER12_{i,t-1}^{RWA} \\ &+ \beta_{10} \cdot NSL_{i,t}^{TA} + \beta_{11} \cdot SLLP_{i,t}^{OL} + \beta_{12} \cdot CH340f_{i,t}^{OL} \\ &+ \beta_{13} \cdot LNTA_{i,t-1} + \mu_i + \epsilon_{i,t} \end{aligned}$$



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Indep.	Exp.	Dep.: GLLP _{i.t}
GLLP _{i,t-1}	(+)	0.113***
GDPGR _t	(+)	-0.001
NDI _{i,t}	(+)	0.009
CHNPL _{i,t+1}	(+/-)	-0.001***
GLLPTD _{i,t}	(+)	0.522***
CHNPL _{i,t}	(+)	-0.001
NPL _{i,t-1}	(+)	0.001***
CHIBL _{i,t}	(+)	-0.000
TIER12 _{i,t-1}	(+/-)	-0.000
NSL _{i,t}	(-)	-0.017***
SLLP _{i,t}	(-)	-0.009***
CH340f _{i,t}	(-)	-0.007
LNTA _{i,t-1}	(+/-)	-0.001***
Obs.		5,110
Test statistics ¹		VALID

¹ Incl. AR (1)/AR (2) tests and Sargan-Hansen test. The number of instruments used is close to the number of clusters (here: 16).

Hypothesis 3 is supported

General LLP seem to primarily follow tax rules.



Variables and research hypotheses: Specific LLP + changes in 340f reserves



Hypothesis 4:The total loan loss reserve is used to cover incurred losses,
expected losses as well as to manage earnings.

$$SLLPCH340f_{i,t}^{OL} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \cdot SLLPCH340f_{i,t-1}^{OL} + \beta_2 \cdot GDPGR_{i,t} + \beta_3 \cdot NDI_{i,t}^{TA} + \beta_4 \cdot CHNPL_{i,t+1}^{OL} + \beta_5 \cdot CHNPL_{i,t}^{OL} + \beta_6 \cdot NPL_{i,t-1}^{OL} + \beta_7 \cdot CHOL_{i,t-1}^{TA} + \beta_8 \cdot TIER12_pre_{i,t-1}^{RWA} + \beta_9 \cdot NSL_{i,t}^{TA} + \beta_{10} \cdot LNTA_{i,t-1} + \beta_{11} \cdot CHOBS_{i,t}^{TA} + \mu_i + \epsilon_{i,t}$$



Total discretionary reserve : System GMM Results



Indep.	Exp.	Dep.: SLLPCH340f _{i,t}
SLLPCH340f _{i,t-1}	(+)	0.120***
GDPGR _t	(+)	-0.001
NDI _{i,t}	(+)	0.635***
CHNPL _{i,t+1}	(+/-)	-0.018***
CHNPL _{i,t}	(+)	-0.059***
NPL _{i,t-1}	(+)	0.024***
CHOL _{i,t}	(+)	-0.008***
TIER12_pre _{i,t-1}	(+/-)	-0.008***
NSL _{i,t}	(-)	-0.861***
LNTA _{i,t-1}	(+/-)	-0.059***
CHOBS _{i,t}	(-)	-0.002
Obs.		26,814
Test statistics ¹		VALID

¹ Incl. AR (1)/AR (2) tests and Sargan-Hansen test. The number of instruments used is close to the number of clusters (here: 16).

Hypothesis 4 is supported

Earnings management is strong for the full reserve.



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Robustness



\mathbf{b}	Alternative macro variables	Credit-to-GDP ratioCredit-to-GDP gap
	Re-estimation for different subsectors	 Cooperative banks Savings banks Commercial banks
	Specific LLP vs. DWO	 DWO play minor role in Germany
	Clustering by county instead of state	 Increases the number of clusters from 16 to more than 100
	Signaling	 Time dummy (<>2007) and its interaction with NDI_{t+1}
	Total loan loss reserve (SLLP + GLLP + CH340f)	 Sum of SLLP, GLLP and CH340f reserves
	Exclusion of anticipated CHNPL	 Results are not driven by endogeneity
	More conservative outlier treatment	





- Specific LLP are to some extent used in a forward-looking way
 - predominant motive: earnings management
 - additionally built in times of high (non-discretionary) earnings, even in the presence of other reserve components
 - Evidence for the coverage of expected losses as well
- **Reserve for latent risks** (§ 340f HGB, a highly discretionary instrument):
 - increased in times of high earnings and low specific LLP
 - used for earnings management and to complement specific LLP

General LLP:

- not explicitly used to cover latent risks in the loan portfolio
- predominant motive: tax management

> Acknowledgement: Results need not hold in other countries due to special setting.



How is managerial discretion used?

- > Tax advantages via general loan loss provisions are reapt whenever possible.
- Specific loan loss provisions are used for earnings management, if possible.
- Invisible reserves for latent risks (§ 340f HGB) are used for earnings management and to complement specific LLP, in particular when the latter are low (and earnings are high).

Altogether, managerial discretion in this setting results in countercyclical (and therefore stabilizing) loss recognition and reserve building by managers.



Thank you for your attention!

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Backup

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
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- In expansionary periods:
 - More liberal credit policy/lower borrowing standards
 - Short-term concerns (Rajan, 1994)
 - Institutional memory hypothesis (Berger/Udell, 2004)
 - Screening profitability (Ruckes, 2004) and bank rivalry (Ogura, 2006)
 - Consequently, the aggregate credit risk in the banking sector rises
- In recessionary periods:
 - Borrowers systematically default, especially if they are hit by a common adverse shock
 - Loans need to be written off
 - Capital crunch (Peek/Rosengren, 1995) is likely if loan loss allowance is insufficient





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- ➢ Incurred loss model (IAS 39):
 - Objective impairment evidence is necessary ("trigger events")
 - Little managerial discretion, reduction of income smoothing (Gebhardt/Novotny-Farkas, 2011)
- > Expected loss model (IFRS 9):
 - > Loan loss allowance is based on both incurred and **expected credit losses**
 - Intended to provide more useful information on an entity's expected credit losses
 - Empirical evidence on earnings management and countercyclical effects is missing
 - Timeliness of expected credit losses?
- "More than an expected loss model" (German Commercial Code HGB)
 - Specific loan loss provisions for incurred and expected credit losses
 - A considerable degree of **discretion** in the accumulation of (hidden) reserves for **latent risks**
 - Earnings management partially and implicitly accepted
 - Countercyclical effects via earnings management? Provisioning for expected losses?




$$GLLA_{i,t}^{taxded} = \frac{\frac{1}{5} (\sum_{k=t-4}^{k=t} LD_{i,k}) - \min\{SLLA_{i,t}; 0.4 \cdot \frac{1}{5} (\sum_{k=t-4}^{k=t} LD_{i,k})\}}{\frac{1}{5} \sum_{k=t-5}^{k=t-1} CL_{i,k}^{risk}} \cdot (CL_{i,t}^{risk} - CL_{i,t}^{SLLP})$$



Graphical evidence – Credit risk reserve vs. Credit-to-GDP ratio








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Backup Graphical evidence – Actual vs. tax-deductible general LLP





Δ.



Backup Descriptive statistics



Variable	n	Mean	Std. dev.	p1	p50	p99
1994-2011 — Full Sample						
Total assets (in billion Euro)	43,565	1.37	18.30	0.01	0.24	11.8
$SLLP_{i,t}^{OL}$ (in %)	38,069	0.44	0.78	-0.51	0.30	2.85
a) Specific LLP (in % of OL)	38,069	0.39	0.73	-0.56	0.26	2.65
b) Direct write-offs (in % of OL) $CH340f_{i,t}^{OL}$ (in %)	$\frac{38,069}{38,069}$	$\frac{0.05}{0.17}$	0.17 0.47	0.00	$0.02 \\ 0.12$	$\frac{0.57}{1.30}$
$GLLP_{i,t}^{OL}$ (in %)	38,069	0.01	0.09	-0.20	0.00	0.24
$SLLA_{i,t}^{OL}$ (in %)	43,434	2.43	2.54	0.00	1.96	10.12
$340 f_{i,t}^{OL}$ (in %)	43,434	1.86	1.66	0.00	1.39	6.97
$GLLA_{i,t}^{OL}$ (in %)	38,069	0.19	0.18	0.00	0.14	0.80
$\frac{NDI_{i,t}^{TA} (\text{in \%})}{(\text{in \%})}$	38,175	1.11	1.48	-0.16	1.05	3.24
$\frac{CHNPL_{i,t}^{OL}}{NPL_{i,t}^{OL}} (in \%)$	36,328 41,907	0.18 6.17	3.05 82.57	-5.92 0.12	0.01	7.18 21.79
$CL_{i,t}^{TA}$ (in %)	41,907 43,485	57.64	14.66	10.12	5.88 59.96	89.43
$IBL_{i,t}^{TA}$ (in %)	43,513	13.60	11.36	0.53	10.96	58.21
$OL_{i,t}^{TA}$ (in %)	43,434	71.27	11.94	38.09	72.36	96.64
$TIER12_{i,t}^{RWA} \text{ (in \%)}$ $NSL_{i,t}^{TA} \text{ (in \%)}$	$43,126 \\ 38,175$	$\begin{array}{c} 14.10 \\ 0.00 \end{array}$	$6.69 \\ 0.23$	8.80 -0.60	$\begin{array}{c} 12.26 \\ 0.00 \end{array}$	$40.60 \\ 0.75$



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